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262 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
wrongfully convicted. t At least two states have expressly provided by statute
thai preyious conviction will not be considered if pardon was granted for
reasons of innocence t2
It is unjust to give a pardon granted for innocence the same limited
application as i now generally given to pardons granted for other reasons.
There is no logical reason why pardons granted for innocence should not
conclusively prevent consideration of the pardoned conviction in an attempt
to apply an habitual offender statute. Recognizing that the executive and
judicial- power of a state should be separated as much as possible, exercise
of the pardoning power for reasons of innocence may be criticizable as an
executive review of a judicial decision.13 The principle of separation of powers
could be better adhered to by instituting an extraordinary judicial remedy
which would only lie whenever such evidence is discovered as would pre-
sefitly result in a pardon for innocence. If such a remedy were available and
made exclusive, all subsequently granted pardons would be granted for reasons
other than innocence. Where that is true, there appears to be no valid reason
why pardoned convictions should be considered in applying habitual offender
statutes.* It is submitted, that if the pardon in the instant case was granted
solely on the basis of innocence, the decision of the court is correct.
GERALD W. VANDEWALLE
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-
ATTORNEY PRAM TING IN STATE OTHER THAN ONE WHERE LICENSED.-In
a discovery proceeding,' plaintiff moved under Rule 34, Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure2 for an orjier requiring the defendant to produce various
documents relating to prior patent litigation. The defendant excepted, con-
tending that certain of the documents were privileged as communications
with its attorney. The plaintiff contested the privileged status of the docu-
ments on the grounds that defendant's counsel was not licensed to practice
in New York where the communications and litigation took place. It was con-
ceded that counsel was a merisber of the District of Columbia and Pennsylvania
Bars. The court held that a lawyer regularly employed by a corporation as
legal counsel who actively participates in litigation qualifies as an "attorney"
within the rule of privileged communication between attorney and client,
though he is not licensed to practice in the state. Georgia-Pacific Plywood
Co. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D. 463 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
11. 28 Harv. L. Rev. 647, 659 (1915).
12. Iowa Code § 747 (1950); N. Y. Code of Crim.' Proc. § 697 (1953).
13. The Federalist No. 47 at 373 (Hamilton ed. 1885) (Madison).
1. See: Sundeland; Discovery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules. 15 Tenn. L.
Rev. 737 (1939).
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, "Discovery And Production of Documents And Things For
Inspection, Copying, or Photographing. Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefore and upon notice to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of Rule 30 (b),
the court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, book abcounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within
the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26 (b) and which are in his possession,
Custody, or control; . . .The order shall specify the time, place, and manner of making
the inspection and taking the copies and photographs and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just." (Italics added)
RECENT CASES
The extent of the exemption from discovery of privileged documents is
not defined by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,3 but must be determined
by the applicable rules of evidence. 4 Federal decisions are follo'wed and not
the law of the state where the cause 'of action" ar se,5 There is a dearth
of judicial authority on whether an attorney licensed in one jurisdiction is
an "attorney" in the meaning of the privilege while practicing in other areas.
One Canadian case, which involved a member of the Ontario Bar who gave
legal advice to a United States citizen in New York concerning A'merican law,
resulted in divided court holding that the communication was not privileged.6
This case is not a precedent binding American courts and differs in several
respects from the instant case.7 A United States District Court sitting in
,Massachusetts has held that attorneys licensed in other states and employed
in a corporate patent department were not within the privilege because their
work was primarily non-legal, but by way of dictum the court indicated that
the privilege might otherwise apply to out of state counsel.8 Another opinion
which supports this view states that, "bar membership should properly be of
the court for the area wherein the services are rendered, but this is not a sine
qua non. "a
The Model Code of Evidence prom.'ulgated by. the American Law Institute
would extend the privilege even further than the principle case.10 Rule 209 (b)
defines "lawyer" as "a person: authorized or reasonably believed by the
client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation the law of
which recognizes a privilege against disclosure of confidential communications
between client and lawyer;"" Modem text writers are in agreement with the
American Law Institute and the principle case.'
2
The holding in the principle case is strongly supported by practical con-
siderations and social policy. Full time legal counsel employed by corpora-
tions should not be required to take bar. examinations and be licensed to prac-
tice in the many states where they may communicate with their client.';
3. 28 U.S.C. following § 723c.
4. Wild v. Payson, 7 F.R.D. 495 (S.D. N.Y. 1946) Hurnphries 'v. Penn. R;R. Co.,
14 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1935).
6. Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio (1953);
Panella v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1953). N.D. Rev. Code
'§ 31-0106 (1943), gives privileged status to communications between attorney and client,
withqut distinguishing between North Dakota attorfieys and other lawyers. N.D. Rev.
Code §27-1127 (Supp. 1953) recognizes is foreign attorneys and allows them to practice
before state courts at the discretion of the individual court. In view of the above statutes
in a North Dakota case, the privilege would probably extend to communications with an
attorney not admitted to practice in North Dakota.
6. Re U.S.A. v. Mommoth Oil Co., 56 Ont. L. Rep. 635, 2 D.L.R. 966 (1925). Cf.
Lawrence v. Campbell, 4 Drew. 485, 62 Eng.Rep. 186 (V.C. 1859), holding that a
duly licensed attorney, while acting for a client belonging to his jurisdiction iswithin the
privilege rdgardless of where the communication takes place.
7. See Re U.S.A. v. Mammoth Oil Co., 56 Ont.L.Rep. 635, 2 D.L.R. 966 (1925).
holding that the mere identity of the client was not privileged. Secondly, it was a United
States Court which was requiring the examination of the attorney.
8. U.S. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 360 (D;C. Mass. 1950)(dictum).
9. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D.C. Del.
1954).
10. Model Code of EvidenceRule 209(b) (1942).-
11. Ibid. See also, Uniform Rules of Evidence, National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, Rule 26.
12. See 1 Morgan, Basic Poblerns of Evidence 99 (1954). 5 Jones, Evidence § 2166
(2d. ed., 1926) "It must also appear that the alleged attorney is a licensed attorney .n
the particular jurisdiction." This statement of the author is only an apparent exception.
An examination of the cases footnoted reveals that they refer without exception "to persons
not admitted to practice anywhere.
13. 18 F.D.R. at 465-466.
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The court apparently overlooked an additional reason for holding the
communications in question privileged. The defendant's counsel was admitted
to practice before the United States District Court of New York to represent
his employer in litigation; and the documents in question were directly con-
nected with that action. It is submitted that admission to litigate a case before
any recognized and established court of law should be sufficient to qualify
counsel as attorney within the scope of the attorney-client privilege for
communications directly connected with that action.'
4
JOHN MICHAEL NILLES
INSURANCE-EXTENT OF LIABILITY-RECOVERY IN ABSENCE OF PECUNIAnY
Loss.-Plaintiff, insured, sued defendant, insurer, to recover for a loss su-
stained under a fire insurance policy issued by defendant. The plaintiff
occupied the insured premises as lessee, the terms of the lease providing that
the lessor would repair any damage to the premises resulting from fire. The
contract of insurance between plaintiff and defendant provided that for the
purposes of that agreement, the plaintiff was to be considered the sole and
unconditional owner. Shortly after the loss suffered under the policy, the
lessor repaired the damaged premises pursuant to the terns of the lease. It was
held that the defendant's liability attached on the happening of the loss and
that subsequent restoration without cost to the plaintiff did not relieve the
defendant of its accrued liability. Citizens Insurance Company v. Foxbilt,
Inc., 226 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1955).
The question of whether an insured may recover when he has suffered no
pecuniary loss is one of controversy. Fire insurance is generally considered
to be a personal contract.' The weight of authority requires that there be an
insurable interest, 2 and that actual pecuniary loss be sustained,3 before there
can be recovery. Generally, a tenant is said to have an insurable interest in
the leasehold. 4 It has frequently been stated by the courts that one may not
make a profit on fire insurance. 5 The rule in England is that the insured is
considered to have suffered no loss when a person under a contract duty to
repair has made good the damage. 6 It is argued in support of the above
position that public policy demands such a result to prevent "wagering con-
tracts" and the intentional destruction of property.
7
14. See Radin The Privileg. of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client 16 Calif. L. Rev. 487 for a scholarly discussion of the history and present status of
the attorney-client privilege.
1. E.g., Traders' Ins. Co. v. Newman, 120 Ind. 554, 22 N.E. 428 (1889); Mack v.
Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 329 I11. 158, 160 N.E. 222 (1928).
2. 4 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 2121 (1941).
3. E.g., Draper v. Delaware State Grange Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 5 Boyce 143, 91 AtI.
206 (Del. 1914); Beman v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 303 111. App. 554, 25 N.E.
2d 603 (1940); Abbottsford Building & Loan Assoc. v. Win. Penn Fire Ins. Co., 133 Pa.
Super. 422, 197 Atl. 504 (1938); Ramsdell v. Ins. Co. of North America, 197 Wis. 136, 221
N.W. 654 (1928).
4. 4 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice §2193 (1941).
5. Accord. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Scheuer, 298 Fed. 257 (5th Cir. 1924);
Tabbut v. American Ins. Co., 185 Mass. 419, 70 N.E. 430 (1904); Liverpool & London
& Globe Ins. Co. v. Boiling, 176 Va. 182, 10 S.E.2d 518 (1940).
6. Darrell v. Tibbitts, 5 Q.B.D. 560 (1880).
7. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Boiling, 176 Va. 182, 10 S.E.2d 518
(1940); It should be noted that the lower court held that Iowa public policy was not
inv olved in the case, but rather the insured's contract right to recover on the insurance
policy. The lower court further stated that if Iowa public policy were believed to be in-
volved, the case would have been remanded to the Iowa state courts courts for decision.
128 F.Supp. 594 (S.D. lova 1955).
